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Introduction
On December 16, 2005, the lower assembly of the 
Belarusian Parliament, the House of Representatives, 
voted unanimously to hold the 2006 presidential elec-
tions in Belarus on March 19, some four months earlier 
than anticipated. The decision closely followed a sum-
mit meeting between President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. That the 
decision was made by the president, rather than the par-
liament, seems clear. The latter had been under the close 
control of the former, particularly after the elections of 
October 2004. Now the president was a candidate for 
an unprecedented third term in office and under the pre-
vailing conditions, certain to win again. In this paper we 
will ask several questions: how was Lukashenka able to 
manipulate the Constitution in order to extend his man-
date? What explains his popular appeal? What was the 
response of the opposition? Who were the candidates and 
what did they stand for? Finally what is the long-term 
outlook for the political and economic future of a repub-
lic that has been termed “the last dictatorship of Europe”? 
What are the chances for regime change in Belarus?
The Referendum and Parliamentary 
Elections of 2004
The decision to hold a referendum, the third during 
Lukashenka's administration,1 on whether the president 
could be permitted to run for a third term in office was 
announced on September 7, 2004, with the date set as 
October 17. The referendum question was announced 
by the president himself during a rally in Minsk:
Do you allow the first president of the Republic of Belarus, Alyak- 
sandr Hryhorevich Lukashenka, to participate in the presidential 
election as a candidate for the post of president of the Republic of 
Belarus and do you accept Part 1 of Article 81 of the Constitu-
tion of Belarus in the wording that follows: “The president shall be
1. Earlier referendums took place in 1995 and 1996, resulting in 
several changes to the Constitution, enhancing the power of the 
presidency, changing the state flag and symbols, elevating Russian 
to the status of a state language, reducing parliament from 260 seats 
to 110, and others. For details, see David R. Marples, Belarus: A 
Denationalized Nation (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1999), 72-75, 96-99.
elected directly by the people of the Republic of Belarus for a term 
of five years by universal, free, equal, direct, and secret ballot?”2
Though the question as outlined was ambiguous, 
since it would be possible in theory to answer positively 
to one question and negatively to the other, many observ-
ers felt that it was also ominous: the president was seek-
ing to remain in office for his lifetime, and at the age of 49 
(in 2004), he could in theory remain in office for another 
three decades. The timing of the announcement was also 
fortuitous. It coincided with the date of the parliamentary 
elections, the hostage taking in the Russian Federation 
at the school in Beslan, and the third anniversary of the 
9-11 terrorist attack on the United States. In this way, 
Lukashenka was able to reassure voters that such horrors 
were inconceivable in Belarus as long as he remained in 
power. On the contrary, he remarked, Belarus looked like 
a giant construction site and no resident of Belarus had 
ever fallen victim to a terrorist attack or a military conflict. 
His decision to hold a referendum was supported openly 
by the chairman of the Central Election Commission 
(CEC) Lidziya Yarmoshyna, who also commented that 
the outcome would be decided by the people of Belarus, 
and not by American politicians who would never be 
satisfied with the political situation in this republic.3
The referendum announcement also coincided with a 
decision by opposition leaders to unite forces in a Demo-
cratic Congress that would elect a single leader to run 
against Lukashenka in the 2006 election. The improve-
ment in opposition organization notwithstanding, no 
anti-government figures succeeded in getting appointed 
to the CEC, despite the fact that some parties applied en 
masse, including 473 candidates from the United Civic 
Party. In addition, most of the prominent opposition 
leaders were excluded from the parliamentary campaign 
on various pretexts. The reasons were diverse, from 
alleged falsehoods on the nomination forms, failure to 
send documents to the CEC in response to inquiries, and 
in the case of former parliamentary chairman Stanislau 
Shushkevich, the fact that his party headquarters was 
located in the district of Masyukov, rather than Pushkin,
2. www.charter97.org, September 7, 2004.
3. Belarusian Television, 2200, September 9, 2004.
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as stated on his application form.4 Anatol Lyabedzka, 
chairman of the United Civic Party, stated that of 59 
candidates put forward for nomination by his party, 32 
had been rejected, and usually for reasons that he felt 
were “absurd.”5 In terms of affiliated candidates, the 
largest number came from the Liberal Democratic Party, 
whose leader, Syarhey Haydukevich, a candidate in the 
2001 presidential elections who ran a distant third, had 
long since made his peace with President Lukashenka.
During the election and referendum campaigns, the 
president appeared regularly on television to make his 
case for amending the Constitution. He was no tsar, he 
stressed, but a man prepared to undertake exhausting and 
serious work. Unlike other potential candidates, he was 
not concerned with his own ambitions. What he termed 
a “Belarusian model for development” had been created 
from the “experience of life in Belarus” and constituted 
a dramatic improvement from the situation a decade 
earlier, when people were going hungry, mass protests 
were occurring in the streets, and corruption was evident 
everywhere. In contrast, he added, under his 10-year 
administration, 90 percent of enterprises were working 
under normal conditions. One reason for his success was 
that he had not turned away from Russia as some oppo-
sitionists advocated. Russia was the country with which 
Belarus was linked most closely under Soviet rule, and 
was the vital source for raw materials.6 To reinforce this 
statement, Belarusian TV ran a program that included 
a scathing attack on the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, which reportedly demoralized 240,000 soldiers, 
as well as Belarusian society. Shushkevich was fin-
gered as the man responsible for this debacle, whereas 
Lukashenka had been the only deputy in the Parliament 
(Supreme Soviet) to oppose the dissolution.7 Despite such 
statements and the one-sidedness of a political campaign 
that deprived those who opposed the referendum ques-
tions from a media voice, opinion polls indicated, on the 
one hand, that nostalgia for Soviet times was fading in 
Belarus,8 and, on the other, that the president was unlikely 
to receive the mandate he sought to run for a third term.
Several independent survey centers indicated that 
support for a change in the Constitution was below 50 
percent of the electorate. They included the Russian Ana-
lytical Center, which revealed that 47.5 percent intended 
to respond positively to the referendum question, 37 per-
cent negatively, 9.7 percent found it difficult to respond,
and 5.8 percent declined to reply.9 At the same time, 
the European Union and United States opted to place a 
ban on four Belarusian leaders from traveling to these 
countries, because of their role in the disappearance of 
prominent politicians, well known for their opposition 
to Lukashenka. The politicians in question were Min-
ister of Internal Affairs Uladzimir Navumau, Prosecu-
tor-General Viktar Sheiman (subsequently the head of 
the presidential administration and then Lukashenka's 
campaign manager in the 2006 election), Minister for 
Sport Yuri Sivakou, and commander of the rapid reaction 
forces, Dzmitry Paulichenka.10 Lukashenka responded to 
the ban with a declaration that the West was seeking to 
assassinate him, accusing some of the opposition lead-
ers of terrorist activity. He also ensured that the elections 
would take place under severely restricted conditions, 
which included advance polling for a substantial portion 
of the population, with demands issued on public trans-
port that people should vote early, and parents of children 
being ordered to come to school by teachers who then 
supervised the early voting of the parents. When vot-
ers arrived at the polling station, they were often plied 
with drink and in most cases the stations were adorned 
with large portraits of the president. At one polling sta-
tion in Minsk, senior citizens were given ballot papers 
on which a cross had already been placed opposite a 
“yes” vote.11 Belarusian Television declared (October 
9) that there would be “no revolution” in Belarus like 
the one in Georgia or the mass protests in Ukraine.
The election and referendum results were thus pre-
dictable, despite the suggestions of opinion polls. The 
turnout was reported as 89.7 percent, and the percent-
age of those supporting the amendment to the Con-
stitution to allow the president to run for a third term 
as over 79 percent. In a similar vein, none of the few 
opposition figures permitted to run for parliament were 
successful. Altogether 108 out of 110 deputies were 
elected on October 17. Among the few successes out-
side the government camp were Haydukevich, who, as 
noted, had changed his allegiance and was backed by a 
pro-government newspaper, Minskiy Kur'yer; Uladzi- 
mir Kruk, a former member of the United Civic Party 
who resigned from the party prior to the election; and 
Olga Abramova, leader of the Belarusian branch of the 
Yabloko Party, who was also a member of the former 
parliament and remains very much the token opposition-
4. See, for example, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belarusi, September 
18, 2004; Minskiy Kur'yer, September 18, 2004; Narodnaya Volya, 
September 16, 2004.
5. www.ucpb.org, September 17, 2004.
6. www.president.gov.by, September 23, 2004.
7. Belarusian Television, September 23, 2004.
8. www.iiseps.by, June 2004.
9. Narodnaya Volya, October 6, 2004. An exit poll con-
ducted by the Gallup Baltic Service, which was based on inter-
views of almost 19,000 people between October 12 and 17, 
indicated that only 48.4 percent of eligible voters supported the ref-
erendum motions. The margin of error in this poll was stated to be 
less than 1 percent. See www.charter97.org, November 5, 2004.
10. Belorusskiy Rynok, October 4-10, 2004.
11. See, for example, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii, October 
12 and 15, 2004.
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ist in the lower house.12 The results were not recognized 
by the EU, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe, while 
the Lithuanian Parliament maintained that the decision to 
extend indefinitely the president's term in office violated 
the democratic traditions of Europe.13 Street protests 
took place in central Minsk, and continued for several 
days, though the number of protesters never rivaled those 
in the streets of Kyiv at this same time. Only Russia's 
President Putin was prepared to accept the results of the 
referendum as valid and binding, though he had not inter-
vened in the campaign as he had in Ukraine, evidently 
recognizing that the results were a foregone conclusion.
The United Opposition Candidate
The anomalies and electoral violations of October 
2004 spurred on the opposition to continue the process 
of electing a single candidate to face Lukashenka. The 
Permanent Council of Pro-Democracy Forces created an 
Organizing Committee to convene a National Congress 
of Democratic Forces that would take place between Sep-
tember 1 and October 1, 2005. The chairman was Alyak- 
sandr Bukhvostau (Bukhvostov), the leader of the now 
defunct Belarusian Labor Party, supported by two depu-
ties, Alyaksandr Dabrovolsky of the United Civic Party 
and Viktar Ivashkevich of the Belarusian Popular Front.14 
By mid-June 2005, meetings around the country, held 
under the most difficult conditions in which meeting halls 
were often closed to participants, had nominated some 
700 delegates to the Congress. By August it was evident 
that the two leading candidates for the opposition's bid 
for the presidency would be Alyaksandr Milinkevich and 
Anatol Lyabedzka. Two fringe candidates also intended 
to run: the Belarusian Party of Communists15 leader
12. Belorusskiy Rynok, October 25-31, 2004.
13. Svobodnye novosti plus, October 27-November 3, 2004; and 
Interfax, November 3, 2004.
14. One should note that the Belarusian Popular Front, founded in the 
late 1980s by Zyanon Paznyak, split into two factions in 1999. One 
faction, which retained the original name, was led until recently by 
Vintsuk Vyachorka (currently the head is Lyavon Barshcheuski) and 
has its headquarters in Minsk. The second is headed by Paznyak, who 
is currently living in exile in Warsaw and has not resided in Belarus 
for the past decade. It is called the Conservative Christian Party of the 
Belarusian Popular Front. Both parties are obliged to use the acronym 
BPF rather than the full name because of a government ban on using 
the word “Belarus” or “Belarusian” in the name of a political party.
15. Similarly there are two branches of the Communist Party in 
Belarus; Kalyakin's wing is in opposition to the Lukashenka govern-
ment. The five main opposition parties are: the BPF, the Women's 
Party, the Social Democratic Party, the United Civic Party, and the 
Party of Communists. The 5-Plus group, based on an earlier arrange-
ment to combine forces against Lukashenka, consisted of the BPF, the
Social Democrats, the Belarusian Labor Party, the United Civic Party
and the Party of Communists. It was also joined by the Belarusian 
Green Party, independent labor unions, and NGOs. At the same time, 
other groups formed a “European Coalition”—the Women's Party, a 
separate wing of the Belarusian Social Democrats (Naradnaya Hra-
Syarhey Kalyakin and Shushkevich, who is affiliated 
with the Belarusian Social Democratic Party. A Political 
Council was being set up to carry out the election cam-
paign, which in turn was to establish a National Execu-
tive Committee or Shadow Cabinet.16 *By August, the 
Congress leaders had begun to despair of finding a build-
ing for the assembly, having been quoted rates of more 
than 60 euros per hour, and there was speculation that the 
election of the single candidate might take place outside 
Belarus, in Smolensk or Kyiv. However, on October 2, 
over 800 delegates were permitted to gather at the Palace 
of Culture affiliated with the Minsk Automobile Factory.
Prior to the voting, Shushkevich, a 71-year old pro-
fessor and corresponding member of the Belarusian 
Academy of Sciences, and also the former leader of 
the country from 1991 to 1994, withdrew his candi-
dacy. Thus three candidates entered the contest: Kalya- 
kin, Lyabedzka, and Milinkevich. In the first round, 
the voting was as follows, and based on 813 votes:
Table 1.





Blank or invalid votes 15
Source: www.bonp.org
Thus Kalyakin, as the third-placed candidate, dropped out 
of the contest and a second round of voting was held:
Table 2.




Blank or invalid votes 16
Source: www.bonp.org
mada), and the unregistered Belarusian Youth Front. In December 
2004, the Five Plus and European Coalition resolved to enter the elec-
tion campaign with a single team, thus forming the Permanent Council. 
As explained below, not all opposition groups were encompassed in 
this formation. For further details, see www.bonp.org/single/con1.html 
16. Narodnaya Volya, August 19, 2005.
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Thus Milinkevich won the election, but by the narrow-
est of margins and with less than a majority of all del-
egates eligible to vote. The narrowness of his victory 
was to cause some difficulties. However, the opposi-
tion had at least succeeded in electing its candidate, and 
at that time it was projected that Milinkevich would 
have at least seven months to organize his platform 
and election campaign. His candidacy also seemed to 
have two significant advantages. Unlike the others, 
he had no previous record as a campaigner, no “bag-
gage” to carry, and unlike Shushkevich he could not be 
identified with alleged past failures in the early period 
of independence. Second, although he had been nomi-
nated by the Popular Front, he had no party affiliation 
and was thus relatively free to outline his platform. 
Who is Milinkevich and what is his political outlook?
Alyaksandr Uladzimirovich Milinkevich was born 
on July 25, 1947, in Hrodna. His great-grandfather and 
great-great-grandfather reportedly participated in the 
Polish uprising against the Russian Empire in 1863 and 
were repressed by the tsarist authorities. His grandfather 
was an activist in the Belarusian movement of the 1920s 
in Hrodna region. His father was a respected teacher in 
the Belarusian SSR. Milinkevich, who holds the degree 
of Candidate of Physics and Mathematics, also started 
his career as a teacher, subsequently moving to the Insti-
tute of Physics of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences. 
For twenty-two years (1978-2000), he was a senior lec-
turer in the Physics Department of Janka Kupala State 
University in Hrodna, with a period of four years spent at 
a university in Algeria in 1980-84. In the period 1990-96, 
he was deputy chairman of the Hrodna city government, 
and played an active role in the development and recon-
struction of the most picturesque city in Belarus. Among 
the projects supported and influenced by Milinkevich 
were the establishment of public associations of Poles, 
Lithuanians, Russians, and Jews, and the creation of the 
Supreme Catholic Seminary. He is the author of 65 sci-
entific works on physics, architecture, and the history of 
culture and education, and speaks five languages, includ-
ing English and German. Married with two sons, he thus 
represents an influential, highly respected academic 
figure with strong ties to Belarus's most Catholic and 
westernized province, with its substantial Polish popula- 
tion.17 However, Milinkevich has insisted that his back-
ground is essentially Belarusian, despite his ancestry.
In an interview with the leading opposition newspa-
per, Narodnaya Volya, Milinkevich provided an outline 
of his political perspective. He stressed that according 
to the Constitution, Belarus is a neutral country, and 
he has no plans that it join NATO or any other military 
unions. The strategic partner must, first of all, be one's
17. www.bonp.org/single/con5.html
neighbors (Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Lat-
via). As for the EU, in which three of those neighbors 
currently hold membership, though there is no immedi-
ate prospect of membership, that goal must still be kept 
in mind for the long term. Belarus currently has many 
economic agreements with Russia and it is necessary to 
ascertain which of them will bring more benefit both to 
countries and peoples, but no agreements that are cur-
rently in force will be annulled. On the other hand, the 
conception of a common currency with Russia (as prog-
nosticated by the terms of the draft papers on the Russia- 
Belarus Union) will not help the Belarusian economy. 
It would tie Belarus to the Russian economy, which is 
completely dependent on world prices for energy. There-
fore it is necessary “to strengthen our own currency,” 
which is a constituent part of the financial and eco-
nomic independence of the country. In this context, he 
believes that at present there is a lack of a viable policy 
that can accommodate both state and private interests. 
Lukashenka evidently intends to give up control over 
Beltransgaz (to Gazprom) in exchange for political sup-
port from Russia in the elections. But the president is 
unpredictable and cannot be relied on to keep his word.18
Concerning the economy, Milinkevich maintains that 
the country could improve its economic status rapidly, 
but this is impossible without foreign investments, which 
are needed to modernize factories, to update equipment 
and install new technology. Small and middle-sized busi-
nesses, in his view, must be given tax breaks in order 
to thrive, and numerous inspectors must be eliminated. 
Banks should not be permitted to bail out chronically bank-
rupt enterprises through credits. Regarding privatization, 
Milinkevich does not differ markedly from the Lukash- 
enka regime. He maintains that the larger enterprises, the 
providers of vital jobs and security, must remain state 
property, while small and middle-sized businesses may 
be privatized. The potential is high because of the highly 
educated workforce, but investments will only material-
ize if this middle-range privatization is introduced. Busi-
ness people cannot thrive, because excessive regulations 
restrict their enterprises. A drastic revision of the system 
would enhance business and simultaneously inflict a blow 
to bureaucrats and deprive them of bribes. The entire 
system, in Milinkevich's opinion, must be simplified 
and improved. He also would like to see changes to the 
taxation system, including the abolition of income tax on 
salaries below the subsistence level and a discussion of 
the possibility of a flat tax for the workforce in general.19





The First Stage of the Election Campaign
The prelude to the announcement of the campaign 
was the December 14 meeting between the Belarusian 
and Russian presidents, Lukashenka and Putin. At this 
meeting, Russia, through Gazprom, offered Belarus a 
price of $46.6 per cubic meter for gas supplies in 2006, 
compared to an offer of $230 for Ukraine. Armed with 
this information, Lukashenka evidently instructed Parlia-
ment to approve the announcement of a March 19 election 
two days later. In addition to a “deal” on gas imports, the 
early announcement also reduced the united opposition's 
chances of mounting a sustained campaign. Lyabedzka 
speculated that the early date may have been chosen 
because the international community would be preoccu-
pied with a hard-fought parliamentary election campaign 
in Ukraine, scheduled for March 26.20 Another possibil-
ity is that Putin suggested the early date so that when 
Russia took up its chairmanship of the G-8 countries that 
summer, it would not suffer the embarrassment of hostile 
comments about the election campaign in its closely allied 
partner, Belarus. By December 28, the Central Election 
Commission had registered initiative groups representing 
eight candidates with the following number of members:
Table 3.
Initial Contenders for the 2006 Presidential Elections and 
Numbers in Initiative Groups









Source: RFE/RL Daily Report, December 27, 2005
The CEC registered all eight initiative groups; the next 
stage of the process, the inspection of the candidates, was 
set for December 29-January 27. During this period each 
candidate was required to gather a minimum of 100,000 
signatures in order to run; no more than 15 percent of 
these signatures could be declared invalid. Registration of 
candidates was scheduled for the period February 12-21.
A number of comments can be made concerning these 
initial results. First, the totals for Milinkevich's initiative 
group were impressive and he was facing few problems
in collecting the necessary number of signatures. Sec-
ond, the candidacy of Zyanon Paznyak appeared suspect, 
because he did not fulfill the residency requirement for a 
presidential candidate, that is, 10 years of full-time resi-
dence in Belarus prior to the election date. Third, Voytov-
ich soon withdrew from the campaign on the grounds that 
the election was not authentic and the results were already 
predetermined. At the same time, he did not cast his vote 
for the Milinkevich team, believing that it was necessary 
for all candidates to withdraw from the contest, leaving 
Lukashenka the sole candidate on March 19, which would 
serve to undermine the validity of the election.21 Fourth, 
the low numbers for the Skarbets campaign suggested 
that he would be unable to mount a serious campaign. 
A former deputy of the opposition group Respublika in 
the House of Representatives, he was arrested in mid-
May 2005 and accused of bribery and illegal business 
activities, and transferred from a prison in Brest to one 
in Minsk. His trial began on January 16. Because Skra- 
bets is a long-time opponent of the Lukashenka regime, 
observers maintained that his arrest and trial were politi-
cally motivated, effectively preventing him from par-
ticipation in the election.22 Of the remaining six candi-
dates, General Valery Fralou, another former member of 
Respublika, was considered a rank outsider. By declaring 
that he was running for election, he threatened to com-
promise the campaign of fellow member of the Social 
Democratic Naradnaya Hramada, Kazulin, and shortly 
thereafter the two campaigns were merged with Kazulin 
as the candidate. Finally, as noted, Haydukevich was not 
an opposition candidate and if there had been a second 
round, he would likely have cast his vote for Lukashenka.
Of the remaining candidates, then, the campaigns 
of Paznyak and Kazulin merit closer analysis (albeit, 
in Paznyak's case, a short-lived affair), since these are 
both well-known opposition figures that decided not to 
support the united opposition candidate, Milinkevich. 
Paznyak, born in 1944, has become something of a mav-
erick figure since fleeing Belarus and being granted refu-
gee status by the United States almost a decade ago. He 
has spent most of his time since then in Warsaw, from 
where he ran another aborted campaign in a mock presi-
dential election staged by the opposition in 1999. He 
has periodically criticized all the leaders of the opposi-
tion in the media for what he perceives as selling out to 
Moscow, the absence of an independent national policy; 
moreover, he has singled out Milinkevich as one of those 
guilty of such defects. Paznyak ran in the presidential 
campaign of 1994 and finished a respectable third behind 
Lukashenka and Vyacheslau Kebich, then the prime min-
ister. Perhaps more than any other figure, he has been 
responsible for highlighting the crimes of Stalinism in
20. Narodnaya Volya, December 29, 2005.
21. The Baltic Times, January 11, 2006.
22. www.charter97.org, December 27, 2005.
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Belarus, and was one of the discoverers of the mass 
graves of NKVD victims at Kurapaty Forest in the north-
ern suburbs of Minsk in 1988. He has also, however, 
rarely cooperated with other opposition leaders, and has 
never compromised on his bitter opposition to Russia. 
Unlike Milinkevich, Paznyak would orient Belarus only 
toward the West and the Baltic States and he has always 
been very concerned with the demise of the Belarusian 
language and what he perceives to be the incursions of 
Russian imperialism in Belarus. Once popular, he is now 
a fringe figure in Belarusian politics with the support of 
less than 2 percent of the electorate. As a non-resident, 
he could not legally take part in the election campaign.
Alyaksandr Uladzimirovich Kazulin was born on 
November 25, 1955, in Minsk. He completed Minsk 
Specialized School No. 87 (with courses taught in Eng-
lish) in 1971, and spent the next two years there work-
ing in the laboratory of the Department of Physics. At 
the same time he taught evening classes at Belarusian 
State University. Between 1974 and 1976 he served 
in the Baltic Fleet. From 1976 to 1983 he attended the 
mechanics-mathematical faculty of the State University 
and played an active role in the Komsomol movement. In 
1986-88 he taught at the same institution, completing his 
candidate degree. In 1988 he started work at the Belaru-
sian Ministry of Education, rising to the position of First 
Deputy Minister, and was one of the authors of the Law 
on Education in Belarus. He also completed a doctoral 
degree during this time. In 1996 he was appointed Rector 
of Belarusian State University directly by the president, 
and introduced a number of schemes to transform the 
university into a profitable institution, including the cre-
ation of an FM radio station. He was fired from the uni-
versity in 2003, following his obvious lack of enthusiasm 
for Lukashenka's 2001 election campaign and a scandal 
involving an enterprise connected with the university 
that deals with the extraction of metals from waste.23 
Though Kazulin had been identified with the establish-
ment up to this point in his career, he has emerged as 
the new leader of the united Social Democratic Party, 
formerly headed by Mikola Statkevich and Shushkevich.
The formation of a united party arose from the ini-
tiative of several party leaders early in 2004 to create 
from several factions one strong party that could unite 
left and left-centrist forces on the eve of a new presiden-
tial election. During 2004, four round-table discussions 
were held in Minsk, and a further two in the regions, and 
on September 26 of that same year a Forum for United 
Social Democrats was held with the participation of 
representatives from Sweden and Latvia. Also in atten-
dance were several delegates perceived at that time as 
potential presidential candidates, including Alyaksandr
23. www.templetonthorp.com/ru/news880
Yaroshuk, Valery Fralou, Pyotr Krauchanka, and Natalya 
Masherauva.24 Kazulin was elected leader of these united 
forces for several reasons: he had no ties to the earlier 
negative experience of the Belarusian opposition; he had 
not made any agreements with foreign political forces 
and thus had the appearance of a candidate free of any 
outside influences. In addition, he was a former member 
of the nomenklatura and had established himself as an 
impressive manager and the leader of a major institution. 
His relative popularity contrasted with that of Shushkev- 
ich and Statkevich, who had had many differences with 
each other and with the other party leaders, and could 
not conceivably offer a serious challenge to President 
Lukashenka; this was particularly so in the case of Stat- 
kevich, who had been the victim of a sustained campaign 
of persecution. But what kind of platform did Kazulin 
plan to offer the electorate of Belarus, and how did it 
differ from the conception of Milinkevich? The answer 
was provided in a lengthy statement that appeared in 
Narodnaya Volya early in 2006, which was based on 
a pamphlet edited by Kazulin and entitled “The Path 
to a Decent Life: The Conception of Belarusian Social 
Democracy” (referred to hereafter as the Conception).
The Conception represents the Social Democrats' 
vision of the recent past and current situation in Belarus, 
and states that the country has suffered a systemic cri-
sis for the past fourteen years. This crisis is rooted in 
the restrictions on democracy, the return of the economy 
and social sphere to administrative-command methods of 
management, as well as the country's international isola-
tion. The centralization of power, based on the so-called 
“presidential vertical,” is becoming stronger, whereas all 
forms of public work and self-expression are becoming 
narrower. The history of Belarus and the values of its 
society, according to the Conception, have been reduced 
to the Soviet period alone. The national language and 
culture, and even the classics of Belarusian literature 
are humiliated and despised. The names of the streets of 
Minsk help to preserve the relics of Russian Bolshevism: 
Volodarsky, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, 
etc. The diagnosis, it states, is tough but obvious. The 
main problem is that property and power are concentrated 
in the hands of the state bureaucracy, and the supreme 
value of state regulation is the decision made by the head 
of state. Most of the decisions made by Lukashenka have 
tended to emanate from his intuition rather than from 
expert advice. Yet the president insists that state politics 
respond to the needs of the population. The authors of the 
Conception ask in response whether Belarus can be termed 
a social state, bearing in mind the following factors:
24. Krauchanka is a former foreign minister who fell foul of the 
government and was appointed ambassador to Japan; Masherauva 
is the daughter for the former Communist era leader Piotr Masherau 
(1918-80), who remains a popular figure in Belarus.
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1. The contract system introduced for workers increases their
state of oppression;
2. The equalization of pensions means that retired professors
and highly qualified engineers get the same pension as a 
street cleaner;
3. The state has not dealt with the problem of upgrading old
houses and apartments in which more than 2.5 million 
Belarusian citizens live;
4. It also does not provide young families with bank credits that
would allow them to construct new residences;
5. It has failed to provide a subsistence level of living for
almost 25 percent of the country's population;
6. It appears to be incapable of solving the problems of
the Belarusian village, the population of which faces 
extinction in the coming decades;
7. It has not met the needs of the population for highly qualified
medical aid;
8. It is among world leaders in terms of the number and
percentage of people arrested.25
According to the Conception, the state struggles not 
against poverty, but against those with the potential to 
make the state richer, namely the intelligentsia and busi-
nessmen. Kazulin's party offers several remedies. In 
the economy, it proposes that the state bureaucracy be 
removed from its uncontrolled management, along with 
the development of all spheres of economic and commer-
cial activity. Licenses should be permitted for private busi-
nesses; shareholders and labor collectives should play an 
active role in the running of factories; tax policy should 
be reformed and the independence of the National Bank 
restored. Economic democracy must be directed toward 
the accelerated development of the country. The Concep-
tion includes a step-by-step (2-5 years) transition from 
presidential rule to a parliamentary republic, the transfor-
mation of the two-tier Parliament into a single assembly, 
a revision of the Electoral Code, the establishment of an 
institute dealing with human rights, and a new administra-
tive division of the country based on the okrug and volost. 
In order to begin state transformation, the Social Demo-
crats demand the reduction of income taxes, the abolition 
of the contract system, reform of pensions, assistance 
to families with children, and the preservation of free 
medical care. In foreign policy, the Conception demands 
that Belarus maintain state neutrality with “sincere and 
friendly” relations with Russia. It should revive warm 
relations with other neighbors and use the geographic 
location of the country to maximum advantage. The ulti-
mate goal is an agreement based on “National Consent” 
and a coalition government relying on popular support.26
Though the prospects for such a Conception to 
be put into practice seem remote, it is worth consider-
ing the deep legacy of Social Democracy in the history 
of Belarus. Most of the leading politicians, including 
Lukashenka, have at one time or another been linked to
25. Narodnaya Volya, January 4, 2006.
26. Ibid.
one or another of the Social Democratic parties that have 
emerged in post-Soviet Belarus. Throughout the prepara-
tory period before the election, Lukashenka retained a 
high level of popularity among the Belarusian public that 
ranged approximately from 40 to 60 percent. This popu-
larity has led one Western analyst to stress that Lukash- 
enka appears to mirror the wishes of the Belarusian elec- 
torate.27 However, it is relatively easy to monopolize the 
voting when only the president has access to the media, 
and appears daily and ad infinitum on national television 
to espouse his views, or is depicted visiting factories, 
villages, or the army. One recalls that in 1992, the level 
of support for Shushkevich, acknowledged today at the 
very least to have been a leader beset by economic prob-
lems, was higher than that for Lukashenka today, with 
the latter running a state that is far more authoritarian 
and in which speaking out against the president is now 
a criminal offence, even during an election campaign! 
In other words, it would be misleading to dismiss the 
opposition—as the president frequently does—as being 
distanced from the needs of the population, or the tools 
of Western powers that would like to see the removal 
of Lukashenka, as the United States has stated overtly.
Lukashenka's Views
The president's political outlook is far from static, 
even on the question of relations with Russia. Shortly 
after the announcement of the 2006 elections, he pro-
vided an exceptionally frank interview to the news-
paper Rossiiskaya gazeta, and the contents were evi-
dently suitable to be published at the same time in the 
president's own mouthpiece, Sovetskaya Belorussiya. 
Though Lukashenka has always lacked a clear concep-
tion of how he perceives the future of the state, he has 
enunciated strong and sometimes ambivalent views on 
a number of issues. It is logical to begin, as he did, with 
relations with Russia and the slow evolution of the Rus-
sia-Belarus Union, first conceived under his first admin-
istration on April 2, 1996, when Boris Yeltsin was the 
Russian president. The state, declared the president, must 
be built through good relations with neighbors, and first 
and foremost with Russia. If Poland and the Baltic States 
prefer not to have friendly links with Belarus, then such 
links will be developed with states that are more will-
ing for such connections. Though Lukashenka has been 
criticized for forming a tight union with Russia, “it can-
not be otherwise.” This situation explains why he and 
Putin reached an agreement on gas prices at the meet-
27. Grigory Ioffe offered this perspective at a panel during the 
AAASS Convention in Salt Lake City, November 4, 2005. A 
more detailed outline of his views can be found in Grigory Ioffe, 
“Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity,” Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 55, no. 8 (2003): 1241-1272.
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ing in Sochi, and why a contract was eventually signed 
between Gazprom and Beltransgaz.28 The Supreme State 
Council that will meet in St Petersburg must also accept 
decisions in the area of issues like pensions and taxes.29
Russia and Belarus, in the president's view, are tied 
together by many problems that require joint resolu-
tion. One is the question of Kaliningrad and its status 
as an outpost of the Russian Federation cut off from the 
motherland. Belarus is in a position to provide assistance 
to this region. The new gas price contrasted with that 
in Ukraine, in which Russia has key defense interests. 
However, Ukraine wishes to join NATO and defense 
installations built in Ukraine will be eliminated. As a 
result, according to Lukashenka, Russian companies 
and the Russian state will lose billions of dollars. There 
is also the possibility that Russia will be obliged to pay 
much more for the lease of bays in Sevastopol for the 
Black Sea Fleet. Belarus, however, had never reacted in 
such a fashion to the Russian neighbor, even when Chu-
bais raised the prices for electricity several years ago. 
On the other hand, Russian interests in Belarus have to 
be clarified. Lukashenka is firmly opposed to the notion 
of a single currency, and believes that Belarusian citi-
zens now prefer the Belarus ruble to the dollar and the 
Russian currency. A Union must be based on equality, 
and Belarus will never accept a situation in which it is 
reduced to a western province of the Russian Federation. 
If he were to agree to such incorporation, “the situation 
here would be worse than in Chechnya.” Though Putin 
has recommended as an alternative that the Union be 
modeled on the EU, Lukashenka would prefer to use the 
experience of the Soviet Union first, and only later, “if 
it is necessary,” the experience of the EU. Thus at pres-
ent the Russia-Belarus Union is at an impasse because 
Russia is unhappy with the terms being suggested by 
Lukashenka, in his new guise as a defender of the repub-
lic's interests, but the Belarusian leader is also intent on 
maintaining intact the foundations of his own authority.30
Lukashenka insists that the economy is thriving 
and the economic reforms listed in the SDP Concep-
tion are not necessary. Over the course of ten years, he 
points out, the GDP has doubled and Belarusian facto-
ries have already entered cooperative agreements with 
counterparts in Russia and elsewhere. “There is a rule 
by which we abide—first consider one's native land and 
then yourself. What is wrong with that?” Therefore, he 
refuses to sell off ailing factories at cut-rate prices and
28. Subsequently, on December 31, 2006, Gazprom and the Bela-
rusian government signed a contract for the supply of Russian gas to 
Belarus for the next five years. In 2007, gas prices were raised to $100 
per 1,000 cubic meters of gas, rising to $250 by 2011. Gazprom also has 
started to purchase shares in the gas transit company Belransgaz that will 
give the Russian company 50 percent owership by this same year (2011).
29. Rossiskaya gazeta, December 29, 2005.
30. Ibid.
will continue to provide facilities such as kindergartens 
and outpatient clinics. Concerning the election date, it 
was not his responsibility and even opposition deputies 
in parliament (he mentions Haidukevich and Abramova) 
preferred and pushed for an early date. People have more 
free time in the spring. If the opposition has no time to 
prepare for a March election, then Lukashenka won-
ders what they have been doing for the past five years 
since they have had ample time to be prepared. He then 
repeats the earlier comment about the great responsibil-
ity of being president; he is not concerned about money 
or having a bank account in Switzerland. “I honestly 
serve my people”—in other words, for Lukashenka the 
election is not about a fight for power. Though some 
people refer to him as “the last dictator of Europe,” 
he is not the chief executive power but rather the per-
son that coordinates all sections of authority. Rather 
he is a president who takes on all the burdens of lead-
ership but gets blamed when everything goes wrong.31
Finally, he broaches the issues of society and color 
revolutions. Civic society is already in place in Belarus 
through youth organizations, veteran's societies, and oth-
ers; these are authentic societies rather than ten people 
getting together with “money from abroad” claiming to 
represent the majority. Even in terms of media, private 
distribution is three times higher than those with state sup-
port. The key point, he feels, and the one that has brought 
him adverse publicity is that Lukashenka does not carry 
out policies that meet with the approval of the West and 
the United States. The so-called color revolutions are in 
his opinion no more than banditry using Western money 
in the interests of elite groups. The U.S. applauds such 
actions, but in the twenty-first century, it is unacceptable 
to overthrow presidents by force with foreign money and 
cunning; it has nothing to do with bravery. As an example 
of the sort of democratic country for which opposition-
ists are clamoring, one should look at France. Belarus 
has created laws in order that it does not fall into the sort 
of chaos that has recently occurred in France. He ends 
with thanks to the Russians for their support and hopes 
that the demographic picture in Russia improves so that 
more people are born than are dying.32 This last statement 
appears especially ironic, given that the demographic cri-
sis and mortality rates in Belarus are as high as in Russia.
The long and often less-than-coherent statement 
indicates several things about Lukashenka's thinking: he 
is obsessed with the notion of a Western-backed color 
revolution, and thus has tightened the laws as to what is 
permissible in the way of dissent to the extent that no one 
can now criticize any of his actions or statements. It is 
illegal for opposition groups to make contact with the EU 





There is no prospect of a radical economic reform, but 
there is also no chance of a complete union with Russia 
that would result in a single currency and single govern-
ment. Yet Russia remains his closest ally and an impor-
tant one, given the apparent forces ranged against him. 
Lukashenka continues to pursue the line of being a “man 
of the people,” a populist president who selflessly works 
for the nation with little personal advantage. However, 
this pose is belied by his authoritarian rule, monopoly over 
the media, and arrests and harassment of every political 
figure who has spoken out against him, usually through 
the courts, OMON troops, or his personal fiefdom, the 
KGB. So what does he offer the electorate? Essentially 
his election is based on security and presidential rule, 
the knowledge that life will not change, pensions will be 
paid on time, and Lukashenka will work for his people. 
If he is removed, then the outcome will be chaos, both 
economic and political: either Belarus will fall under the 
sway of an increasingly lengthy list of hostile powers: 
U.S., Western Europe, Poland, and the Baltic states; or it 
will become part of the Russian Federation with young 
Belarusians enlisted to fight in Chechnya and elsewhere. 
Simply put, it is the politics of fear, enhanced by tight 
control over the state apparatus and election procedures.
The Results
and Aftermath of the 2006 Election
The results of the election were clearly predictable 
during the gathering of signatures for the candidates. 
Through pressure on employees of factories, students, 
and other groups for mass signings, the incumbent 
president amassed more than 1.9 million signatures by 
February 17th, or about one-third of the entire elector- 
ate.33 The only other candidates to obtain the minimum 
100,000 signatures were Milinkevich, Kazulin, and 
Haydukevich. The campaign was conducted under very 
restricted conditions for the opposition candidates: they 
lacked access to the media, other than two brief TV and 
radio broadcasts of less than 30 minutes each, their cam-
paign staffs were arrested (including every major figure 
in both opposition camps), opposition newspapers were 
harassed and in one instance confiscated outright, and 
they were prevented physically and through petty laws 
from holding public meetings. Though the president had 
maintained he would not campaign, he appeared daily on 
television, and he made several major speeches. He also 
convoked what was termed the “Third All-Belarusian 
People's Assembly,” composed of his supporters, which 
essentially amounted to setting out his policy for the 
future. While trying to register for this assembly, Kazu-
33. For a detailed account of the election campaign, see Joerg Forbrig, 
David R. Marples, and Pavol Demes, ed. Prospects for Democracy in 
Belarus (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006).
lin was detained and beaten by Special Forces under the 
command of Dzmitry Paulichenka, one of the president's 
most repressive henchmen. His presence was justified 
on the grounds that the opposition, in league with for-
eign powers, was planning a coup! Some 30 percent of 
the voting was conducted the week prior to the election.
On 20 March, the chair of the Central Election Com-
mission Lidziya Yarmoshyna, a close ally of Lukash- 
enka, announced the preliminary results: Lukashenka 
had received 5.46 million votes (82.6 percent), with the 
other candidates well behind. Milinkevich was reported 
as garnering around 400,000 (6 percent), Haydukevich 
250,000 (3.5 percent), and Kazulin, 154,000 (2.3 per-
cent). When the final tally was revealed, the totals were 
even more unrealistic, as the president now had 5,501,249 
out of 6,630,653 votes, or 83 percent, and the turnout 
was reported at 93 percent, an unlikely figure and unique 
during post-Soviet elections in the European republics of 
the former Soviet Union. The opposition candidates and 
their supporters—particularly youth groups—mounted 
a sustained protest over several days in October Square 
near the center of the city of Minsk, which also ended 
with a violent confrontation and arrests. Both Kazulin, 
arrested on 25 March, and Milinkevich, arrested on 26 
April following the Chernobyl 20th anniversary demon-
stration, were incarcerated.34 *Their treatment reflected 
the nature of the most undemocratic election to date 
under the Lukashenka administration, one that was con-
demned by most outside observers, including the EU, the 
OSCE, and the United States. But what significance can 
be ascribed to the 2006 election and what does it sig-
nify for the future of this small central European nation?
Conclusion
Several issues defined the election. First, the incum-
bent president employed the tactic of creating an image 
of a state surrounded by enemies; one bolstered by the 
refusal of EU countries to grant travel visas to Lukash- 
enka and selected members of his cabinet. The con-
stant references to the “last dictatorship” or to Belarus 
as an “outpost of tyranny” (as described by U.S. Sec-
retary of State Condoleezza Rice) are important in 
terms of highlighting the repressive internal situation
34. After the election, Kazulin was arrested during a public dis-
turbance. In July 2006, he received a 5 1/2-year confinement at a
hearing. Subsequently, he went on hunger strike and was declared a 
prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. In February 2008, 
following the death of his wife Iryna from breast cancer, he was 
permitted a three-day leave to attend the funeral, but then returned to 
the penal colony in Vitsebsk region, despite international pleas for his 
release. At the time of writing, both the U.S. and Belarus ambassadors 
have been called home, after the United States reportedly increased 
sanctions against Belarus, ostensibly in protest at the treatment of 
Kazulin. See Belorusy i Rynok, February 25-March 3, 2008.
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within Belarus, but they also provided an instrument 
for the president's official portrayal of a beleaguered 
small nation surrounded on three sides by hostile pow-
ers that would like to inculcate an internal revolution. 
Second, the state administration had enormous advan-
tages in the coming election, not least in its ability to fill 
the vacant positions in the territorial commissions and 
the Central Election Commission with its own support-
ers. The opposition to date has not succeeded in getting 
any of its members on these commissions, thus bringing 
to mind Stalin's dictum that it is not a question of how 
many votes one gets, but of who is counting the votes.
The third and critical factor was that some divisions 
remained within the opposition. Despite the best efforts 
of the united forces to come up with a single candidate, 
both Milinkevich and Kazulin moved on to the March 
19th contest. The situation reflects, in part, the reluctance 
of the Social Democrats to pledge allegiance to a leader 
who was proposed, even though he was not attached 
to, the Popular Front. Those leaders who had sacrificed 
their own ambitions to support Milinkevich were not 
amused. Lyabedzka, for example, attributed such disaf-
fection to personal vanity, people thinking about embla-
zoning “Candidate for the Presidency” on their business 
cards.35 The two candidates at times worked together and 
even complemented each other. Whereas Milinkevich 
appeared calm and determined, Kazulin took on the role 
of rabble-rouser, with an inflammatory TV broadcast 
that shocked many viewers, and he evidently smashed 
a portrait of Lukashenka in the police station following 
his arrest on March 25. Though the president remains 
personally popular, few objective observers accept that 
he could have attained a total of 83 percent of the vote. 
The consensus is that his support by election-day lay 
somewhere in the 50-60 percent range. Fourth, as Mil-
inkevich and others have stressed, communication with 
the electorate was crucial and this candidate embarked 
on an extensive program to visit as many areas of the 
country as possible, but did not have time to complete 
this campaign. It was not sufficient to win the election, 
but it raised public awareness of the issues and the poten-
tiality for change if not in 2006, then in the near future.
Lastly, there is every indication that the Belarusian 
electorate places issues like economic welfare above 
party or election politics. In other words, the popular-
ity of the president owes more to the relatively benign 
economic situation in the republic, at least as com-
pared with the early years of independence, than to his 
political views. This economic stability and progress is 
somewhat illusory. It could end “tomorrow” if Russia's 
Gazprom decided, as it has indeed threatened, to raise 
oil and gas prices to the levels charged to Ukraine or to
35. Narodnaya Volya, December 29, 2005.
Western Europe. In order to maintain the artificially low 
level prices, Lukashenka, as noted, has already sacrificed 
50 percent ownership of the Belarusian company Bel- 
tranzgas, which controls the processing and transport of 
Russian resources on Belarusian territory, to Gazprom. 
The EU has imposed sanctions on Belarus following the 
flawed election, but they pertain to the travel of indi-
viduals within the Lukashenka leadership (and the presi-
dent himself). To date it has not restricted the delivery 
of goods to Belarus, which constitutes the largest por-
tion of Belarus's imports. The conception therefore of a 
Belarus as an economically prosperous and thriving state 
under Lukashenka is somewhat contrived. No doubt: 
Russia was content with the election results in Belarus, 
but could have done without the violence that ensued 
and the manipulation of the final figures that provided 
Lukashenka with an unrealistically high vote total and a 
first-round victory. On several grounds, however, there 
are causes for concern for the Lukashenka regime. The 
opposition is much more mobilized than hitherto, partic-
ularly youth groups; the government is increasingly iso-
lated from Europe and the United States and hence reliant 
on Russia; and the latter country has the power and pos-
sibly the inclination36 to place more pressure on Belarus 
to make concessions in return for continued economic 
stability. A referendum on the Russia-Belarus Union has 
been anticipated for some time and it remains to be seen 
how much sovereignty of his country Lukashenka is pre-
pared to compromise in order to stay in power indefinitely.
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36. To some extent that reflected pressure on Vladimir Putin from the 
other countries of the G-8. Russia hosted the summer session in St. 
Petersburg for the first time, and did not wish to see this prestigious 
occasion undermined by embarrassing questions about the rogue 
regime in Minsk.
57
